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Abstract
A recent paper presents the “false confidence theorem” (FCT) which has potentially
broad implications for statistical inference using Bayesian posterior uncertainty. This the-
orem says that with arbitrarily large (sampling/frequentist) probability, there exists a set
which does not contain the true parameter value, but which has arbitrarily large posterior
probability. Since the use of Bayesian methods has become increasingly popular in appli-
cations of science, engineering, and business, it is critically important to understand when
Bayesian procedures lead to problematic statistical inferences or interpretations. In this
paper, we consider a number of examples demonstrating the paradoxical nature of false
confidence to begin to understand the contexts in which the FCT does (and does not) play
a meaningful role in statistical inference. Our examples illustrate that models involving
marginalization to non-linear, not one-to-one functions of multiple parameters play a key
role in more extreme manifestations of false confidence.
Keywords: Bayesian methods; belief functions; epistemic probability; Fieller’s theorem;
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Balch, Martin & Ferson (2017) presents the phenomenon of “false confidence”
associated with Bayesian posterior uncertainty. The authors come about the concept of false
confidence from an alarming application to satellite collision risk analysis when estimating the
posterior probability of the event that two satellites will collide. They found that increased mea-
surement error of satellite trajectory data leads to decreased posterior probability of satellites
colliding. Essentially, as more noise is introduced into trajectory measurements we become less
certain about satellite trajectories, and thus the probability of two satellites colliding decreases.
However, since a posterior probability is an additive belief function (probabilities of mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive sets sum to one) the probability of the two satellites not
colliding must increase accordingly, making their respective trajectories appear safer. When
taken to the extreme, a large enough measurement error will cause an analyst to be (mistakenly)
certain the satellites will not collide. Conversely, when viewed from a likelihood-based sampling
distribution framework, more noise in the trajectory data suggests that the satellite trajectories
are less certain and therefore are less likely to collide because of the infinitely large number of
possible paths they could each take. This alternative interpretation is not problematic.
More on the specifics and importance of satellite collision risk analysis are provided in Balch
et al. (2017). To study the mechanics behind what is happening at a more fundamental level
the authors present what they term the “false confidence theorem” (FCT). This theorem says
that with arbitrarily large (sampling/frequentist) probability, there exists a set which does not
contain the true parameter value, but which has arbitrarily large posterior probability. Such a
phenomenon is unsettling for a practitioner making inference based on a posterior distribution.
Moreover, the authors prove that false confidence effects all types of epistemic uncertainty
represented by additive probability measures. This includes Bayesian posterior probabilities,
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fiducial probabilities, and probabilities derived from most confidence distributions (Balch et al.
2017).
Our goal is to illustrate the intuition and mechanics of the FCT in simple examples so that
we can begin to understand more complicated manifestations of the FCT. Such insight provides
a particularly useful contribution to the literature as the use of Bayesian methods becomes more
popular. Our contributions in this paper are the following.
First, we present a simple example to illustrate the mechanics of the FCT with the statistical
problem of estimating the support parameter of the U(0, θ) distribution. This is an example in
which the mathematics for the FCT can be worked out analytically and demonstrates where each
piece in the statement of the FCT originates from. In most other situations the mathematics
cannot be worked out analytically due to the fact that the typical posterior distribution function
does not have a readily understood sampling distribution. In the Appendix we provide similar
results for a one parameter Gaussian model.
Next, we show that the FCT manifests in an even more pronounced way by extending the
first example to a two parameter model, i.e., U(0, θx) and U(0, θy) with θx 6= θy, and considering
the marginal posterior distribution of the parameter ψ = θxθy. This example alludes to the
intuition that false confidence is likely at play in situations in which the Gleser-Hwang theorem
applies (Gleser & Hwang 1987). Such examples are characterized in the frequentist paradigm by
exhibiting infinitely large confidence intervals required to obtain less than 100 percent coverage
(Berger et al. 1999, Gleser & Hwang 1987). One such famous problem appears in Fieller’s
theorem (Fieller 1954) which has been discussed as recently as the last two meetings of the
Bayesian, Fiducial, and Frequentist Conference (2017, 2018), and in the forthcoming paper
Fraser, Reid & Lin (2018).
Finally, we demonstrate that the manifestation of the FCT is immediately apparent in a
problem related to Fieller’s theorem. We show that in reasonable situations the FCT applies to
sets which would be concerning in practice. The contribution of such a striking example of false
confidence is worrisome in an era in which Bernstein-von Mises type results are unhesitatingly
appealed to even when it may not be appropriate (e.g., certain small sample situations). Such
a phenomenon should be properly understood for the appropriate use of Bayesian methodology
in practice.
Broadly, the axioms of probability laid down by Kolmogoroff (1933) have enabled a rich
mathematical theory, however, their suitability for modeling epistemic uncertainty has been
met with some discontent, particularly the axiom of additivity (Shafer 2008). The issue with
additivity is that it does not leave room for ignorance (i.e., events are either true or false) which
is a major underpinning of the FCT. Theories of inference which weaken additivity assumptions
include inferential models (Martin & Liu 2016b) and imprecise probabilities (Weichselberger
2000, Gong & Meng 2017).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and describes the FCT as given in
Balch et al. (2017). Sections 3, 4, and 5 present and analyze the illustrative examples, and
additional analysis is provided in the Appendix. The R code to reproduce the numerical results
presented in this paper is provided at https://github.com/idc9/FalseConfidence.
2 Main ideas
This section presents the false confidence theorem from Balch et al. (2017).
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Theorem 1 (Balch, Martin & Ferson (2017)). Consider a countably additive belief function
BelΘ|X characterized by an epistemic probability density function pix(·) on Ωθ (the parameter
space), with respect to the Lebesgue measure, satisfying supθ∈Ωθ pix(θ) <∞, for PX|θ-almost all
x. Then, for any θ ∈ Ωθ, any α ∈ (0, 1), and any p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a set A ⊆ Ωθ with
positive Lebesgue measure such that A 63 θ, and
PX|θ
({
X : BelΘ|X(A) ≥ 1− α
}) ≥ p. (1)
θ | x1n
Figure 1: A sample of realizations from the sam-
pling distribution of the posterior density of the
mean, θ, for Gaussian data with known variance
and normal prior on θ. The green shaded region
(Ac) is an ε-ball around the true parameter value
of θ.
While Theorem 1 pertains to any form of epis-
temic probability, for concreteness we will focus
on Bayesian posterior probability. This amounts
to considering situations in which
BelΘ|X(A) =
∫
A
pix(θ) dθ
=
∫
A
fX|θ(X)pi(θ)∫
Ωθ
fX|ϑ(X)pi(ϑ) dϑ
dθ =: PΘ|X(A).
To better understand the statement of (1), Figure
1 demonstrates the pieces at play. The green re-
gion represents an example of a particular Ac as
described in the theorem, and each curve repre-
sents a particular realization of the posterior dis-
tribution (associated with PΘ|X) over the sampling
distribution of the data (associated with PX|θ).
Heuristically speaking, false confidence says
that for some set, say A ⊆ Ωθ, which does not
contain the true parameter value, the (epistemic)
posterior probability PΘ|X(A) can be made arbi-
trarily large with arbitrarily large (aleatory) sam-
pling/frequentist probability, i.e., with respect to PX|θ. Although the simple existence of such
sets A does not immediately raise concerns about statistical inference, for a given situation there
may exist practically important sets, such as in the satellite collision risk analysis example of
Balch et al. (2017). Note that these sets A may be particularly concerning for finite sample
sizes.
The proof given in Balch et al. (2017) of the false confidence theorem relies on constructing
a neighborhood around the true parameter value. Accordingly, we investigate further the
properties of such sets which satisfy Theorem 1 in a few simple and illustrative examples.
3 Uniform with Jeffreys’ prior
Here we investigate the FCT for uniformly distributed data where the goal is to estimate the
support of the distribution. The motivation for considering this example is that it is simple
enough that all of the mathematics can be worked out analytically. Let X1, . . . , Xn be a random
sample from the U(0, θ) distribution where θ is an unknown parameter. Using the Jeffreys’ prior,
pi(θ) = 1/θ, the posterior will be θ | Xn1 ∼ Pareto(n,X(n)) where X(n) is the maximum of the
observed data (see Robert (2007)).
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Suppose the true value of θ is θ0 and fix α, p ∈ (0, 1). Then by the proof of Theorem 1 (see
Balch et al. (2017)) there exists ε > 0 such that
PXn1 |θ0
({
Xn1 : Pθ|Xn1 (Aε) ≥ 1− α
}) ≥ p, (2)
where Aε ..= [θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε]c, Pθ|Xn1 is the posterior law of θ (the additive belief function),
and PXn1 |θ0 is the probability measure associated with the sampling distribution of the data.
Note that in this example the Jefferys’ prior is a probability matching prior in the Welch-Peers
sense (see Reid et al. (2003)); in particular, the interval Cx := (−∞, X(n)α− 1n ) is such that
Pθ|Xn1 (Cx) = 1− α = PXn1 |θ0(X(n)α−
1
n ≥ θ0). Since the probability matching prior property in
one-dimensions pertains to intervals, this fact provides further justification for considering the
Jeffreys’ prior for analyzing sets of the form Aε.
To compute the left side of (2), first re-express as
PXn1 |θ0
(
Fθ|Xn1 (θ0 + ε)− Fθ|Xn1 (θ0 − ε) ≤ α
)
= PXn1 |θ0
(
1−
(
X(n)
θ0 + ε
)n
−
[
1−
(
X(n)
θ0 − ε
)n]
1{X(n) ≤ θ0 − ε} ≤ α
)
= PXn1 |θ0
((
X(n)
θ0 − ε
)n
−
(
X(n)
θ0 + ε
)n
≤ α
)
· PXn1 |θ0(X(n) ≤ θ0 − ε)
+ PXn1 |θ0
(
1−
(
X(n)
θ0 + ε
)n
≤ α
)
· PXn1 |θ0(X(n) > θ0 − ε)
= PXn1 |θ0
(
X(n) ≤ α 1n
(
1
(θ0 − ε)n −
1
(θ0 + ε)n
)− 1n)
·
(
θ0 − ε
θ0
)n
+ PXn1 |θ0
(
X(n) ≥ (1− α) 1n (θ0 + ε)
)
·
[
1−
(
θ0 − ε
θ0
)n]
.
The second equality comes from the fact that the CDF of the Pareto(k,m) distribution is given
by F (x) =
(
1 − (mx )k)1{x ≥ m}. The third equality comes from considering the two cases of
the indicator function, and the final equality comes from solving for X(n).
Observe that
X(n)
θ0
∼ Beta(n, 1) (i.e., maximum order statistic of a U(0, 1) random sample)
which gives P (X(n) ≤ x) =
(
x
θ0
)n
. Accordingly,
PXn1 |θ0
({
Xn1 : Pθ|Xn1
(
[θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε]
) ≤ α})
= min
{
1, α
[(
θ0
θ0 − ε
)n
−
(
θ0
θ0 + ε
)n]−1}
·
(
θ0 − ε
θ0
)n
+
(
1− (1− α)
(
θ0 + ε
θ0
)n)
1
{
ε ≤ θ0
(
(1− α)− 1n − 1)} · [1− (θ0 − ε
θ0
)n]
.
(3)
Setting the right side of equation (3) equal to p gives p as a function of the α, n, and ε which
satisfy the false confidence theorem. Specifically, we want to know if ε can be large enough to
have a practically meaningful or harmful effect for statistical inference on θ0. The relationship
between ε and p, for α = .5, is plotted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The leftmost panel is a plot of the sampling probability, p, as a function of ε, as given by equation
(3), for α = .5. The center and rightmost panels are randomly observed realizations of the posterior density of
θ, with a .3-ball around θ0 represented by the shaded green regions. In all panels, the true parameter value is
set at θ0 = 1.
The leftmost panel in Figure 2 shows, for α = .5, the sampling probability (i.e., p) that
the posterior probability of Acε = [θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε] is less than α, for ε-balls of various radii. For
example, with n = 1 the posterior probability of Acε (which contains the true parameter value)
will not exceed .5 for ε ≤ .3, for more than 80 percent of realized data sets. This has the
interpretation that the Bayesian test of “accept Acε” if and only if Pθ|Xn1 (A
c
ε) > .5 would be
wrong more than 80 percent of the time.
Displayed on the next two panels of the figure are a few randomly observed realizations of
the posterior density of θ, with a .3-ball around θ0 represented by the shaded green regions. The
realizations of the posterior density are typically concentrated around the true value, θ0 = 1.
The next section demonstrates how to extend this example into a situation even more amenable
to false confidence.
Remark 1. This uniform example is one of the few simple examples where we can analytically
work out the FCT in a straightforward manner. For example, for interval sets, equation (2)
shows the posterior CDF needs an analytic sampling distribution.
4 Marginal posterior from two uniform distributions
Assume X1, . . . , Xn
iid∼ U(0, θx), and independently Y1, . . . , Ym iid∼ U(0, θy). Using the Jeffreys’
prior, gives θx | Xn1 ∼ Pareto(n,X(n)) and θy | Y m1 ∼ Pareto(m,Y(m)). Further, define the
nonlinear functional ψ = θxθy, and derive the posterior distribution of Ψ as follows. By inde-
pendence,
PΨ|Xn1 ,Ym1 (Ψ ≤ ψ) =
∫ ∞
Y(m)
Pθx|Xn1
(
θx ≤ ψ
θy
)mY m(m)
θm+1y
dθy
=
∫ ∞
Y(m)
[
1−
(X(n)θy
ψ
)n]
1
{ ψ
θy
≥ X(n)
}mY m(m)
θm+1y
dθy,
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where the last expression results from the form of the Pareto CDF. If n 6= m, then this equation
simplifies to
PΨ|Xn1 ,Ym1 (Ψ ≤ ψ) = 1 +
( m
n−m
)
(X(n)Y(m))
nψ−n −
( n
n−m
)
(X(n)Y(m))
mψ−m,
and if n = m, then the distribution function has the form
PΨ|Xn1 ,Ym1 (Ψ ≤ ψ) = 1−
[
1 + n log
(
ψ
X(n)Y(n)
)](
X(n)Y(n)
ψ
)n
.
In both cases, the support of Ψ is (X(n)Y(m),∞).
For simplicity, attention will be restricted to the n = m case. This analytic marginal poste-
rior distribution function makes it simple to estimate p := PXn1 ,Y n1 |ψ0
({
Xn1 , Y
n
1 : Pψ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (A
c
ε) ≤
α
})
, for Acε = [ψ0 − ε, ψ0 + ε] and various values of ε, by simulating data sets and computing
the empirical mean, i.e.,
p̂k =
#
{
Xn1 , Y
n
1 : Pψ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (A
c
ε) ≤ α
}
k
, (4)
where k is the number of simulated data set pairs {Xn1 , Y n1 }. This is done in Figure 3 for
generated data sets. The true values are set at θ0x = 10 and θ
0
y = 1 which gives ψ0 = 10. Also
displayed are a few realizations of the posterior density to illustrate where things go wrong.
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Figure 3: The leftmost panel is a plot of the estimated sampling probability, p̂k, as a function of ε, as given by
equation (4), for α = .5. The center and rightmost panels are randomly observed realizations of the posterior
density of Ψ, with a 6-ball around ψ0 represented by the shaded green regions. In all panels, the true parameter
value is set at ψ0 = 10.
From Figure 3 it becomes clear how the FCT manifests. For n = 1, the ε-ball around ψ0 = 10
with diameter even larger than 12 has posterior probability not exceeding α = .5, with sampling
probability, p, essentially equal to 1. As in the previous section, this has the interpretation that
the Bayesian test of “accept Acε” if and only if Pθ|Xn1 (A
c
ε) > .5 would essentially always be
wrong. Furthermore, in this case the Bayesian test would fail for an interval (containing the
true parameter value) which has length longer than the magnitude of the true parameter value.
Although this is a toy example being used for pedagogical purposes, it is nonetheless alarm-
ing. One would hope that the small sample size of n = 1, while resulting in less posterior
6
certainty about the location of the true parameter value, would be accompanied by more sam-
pling variability/uncertainty. Rather Figure 3 implies the interpretation that we are more
certain about an answer which is in fact false. The center and rightmost panels of Figure 3
illuminate part of what is happening behind the scene; the posterior densities are typically
diffuse around ψ0. The next section presents a more extreme instance of this phenomenon.
5 Marginal posterior from two Gaussian distributions
Assume X1, . . . , Xn
iid∼ N(θx, σ2), and independently Y1, . . . , Yn iid∼ N(θy, σ2). Suppose also
that σ is known. Using independent Jeffreys’ priors, gives θx | Xn1 ∼ N(X¯n, σ2n−1) and
θy | Y n1 ∼ N(Y¯n, σ2n−1). In this context, the nonlinear functional ψ = θxθy is related to the
classical Fieller’s theorem in which infinite confidence intervals are required to attain frequentist
coverage (Fieller 1954, Gleser & Hwang 1987, Berger et al. 1999).
The posterior density function for ψ can be derived by transforming the two-dimensional
posterior of (θx, θy) into the space of (ψ, γ) = (
θx
θy
, θy) =: g(θx, θy) and then computing the
marginal distribution of ψ. Observe that g−1(ψ, γ) = (ψγ, γ) which gives the Jacobian for the
transformation,
J(ψ, γ) = det
(
γ ψ
0 1
)
= γ.
Then the joint posterior density has the form
piψ,γ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (ψ, γ) = piθx|Xn1 (ψγ) · piθy |Y n1 (γ) · |γ| · 1{γ 6= 0}.
Recalling the forms of the posterior densities for θx and θy, and integrating over γ gives
piψ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (ψ) =
∫
piψ,γ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (ψ, γ) dγ
=
(
n
2piσ2(1 + ψ2)
) 1
2
exp
{ n
2σ2
[
(ψX¯n + Y¯n)
2
1 + ψ2
− X¯2n − Y¯ 2n
]}
· Eγ|ψ(|γ|),
(5)
where the expectation is taken over γ | ψ ∼ N
(
ψX¯n+Y¯n
1+ψ2
, σ
2
n(1+ψ2)
)
.
This marginal posterior is easily estimable, and p := PXn1 ,Y n1 |ψ0
({
Xn1 , Y
n
1 : Pψ|Xn1 ,Y n1 (A
c
ε) ≤
α
})
, for Acε = [ψ0 − ε, ψ0 + ε] and various values of ε, can be estimated with an approximating
Riemann sum using equation (5). The estimated p as a function of ε is displayed in Figures
4 and 5 for α = .5 and α = .05, respectfully, and for various noise levels, σ. The true mean
values are set at θ0x = .1 and θ
0
y = .01 which gives ψ0 = 10. Displayed in Figure 6 are a few
random realizations of the posterior densities from (5), for various sample sizes, n, with σ = 1,
to illustrate part of where things go wrong.
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Figure 4: Each panel is a plot of the estimated sampling probability of p, as a function of ε, using the posterior
density equation (5), and setting α = .5. The true parameter value is ψ0 = 10.
Remarkably, for almost all values of n and σ considered in Figure 4 the Bayesian test of
“accept Acε” if and only if Pθ|Xn1 (A
c
ε) > .5 would fail for ε as large as 8. Even considering the
extreme choice of α = .05 as in Figure 5, the sampling probability, p, exceeds 80 percent chance
(in the case of σ = 1) that Pθ|Xn1 (A
c
ε) ≤ .05 for ε as large as 4, with n = 100.
A further illustration of what is happening is once again provided with random realizations of
the marginal posterior densities presented in Figure 6. For this problem they heavily concentrate
away from the true value ψ0 = 10. Consequentially, any inference on the true value of ψ is sure
to be misleading, and hence this situation is an extreme example of the manifestation of false
confidence in a well-studied classical problem. Similar results hold for the manifestation of false
confidence in other non-linear marginalization examples, e.g., the coefficient of variation which
is discussed in the Appendix.
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
σ = 0. 5
radius of ε−ball
sa
m
pl
in
g 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
n = 1
n = 30
n = 100
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
σ = 1
radius of ε−ball
sa
m
pl
in
g 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
n = 1
n = 30
n = 100
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
σ = 2
radius of ε−ball
sa
m
pl
in
g 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
n = 1
n = 30
n = 100
Figure 5: Each panel is a plot of the estimated sampling probability of p, as a function of ε, using the posterior
density equation (5), and setting α = .05. The true parameter value is ψ0 = 10.
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Figure 6: Each panel exhibits randomly observed realizations of the posterior density of ψ, equation (5), with a
4-ball around ψ0 = 10 represented by the shaded green regions.
6 Concluding remarks and future work
There is currently little theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of false confidence or of
when it plays a significant role in statistical analysis. We demonstrate ramifications of false
confidence in standard, single parameter models as well as models involving the marginalization
of multiple parameters. Our examples illustrate that models involving the marginalization to
non-linear, not one-to-one functions of multiple parameters seem to play a key role in more
extreme manifestations of false confidence. In future work we seek to gain an understanding of
why the FCT is problematic in these situations.
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A Gaussian with Gaussian prior
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Figure 7: Contour plots of ε as a function of α and p for three different values of n when θ0 = 1 and σ
2 = 1.
The value of ε for α = 0.5 and p = 0.95 is marked with an X.
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Here we provide additional analysis to investigate the FCT for normally distributed data where
the goal is to estimate the population mean. Let X1, . . . , Xn be a random sample from N(θ, σ
2),
where σ2 is known, but θ is not and is the object of inference. Consider a prior distribution of
θ ∼ N(µ, τ2).
Then the posterior distribution is θ | Xn1 ∼ N (µn, τn) where µn ..=
(
µ
τ2
+ nX¯n
σ2
)
τ2n, τ
2
n
..=(
1
τ2
+ n
σ2
)−1
, and X¯n ..= n
−1∑n
j=1Xj . See Hoff (2009) for details.
Suppose the true value of θ is θ0 and fix α, p ∈ (0, 1). Proceeding through the analogous
steps as in Sections 3-5 (i.e., we compute ε, α, and p such that equation (2) holds),
Pθ|Xn1
(
[θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε]
)
=
∫ θ0+ε
θ0−ε
1√
2piτ2n
exp
(
−1
2
(
θ − µn
τn
)2)
dθ
= Φ
(
θ0 − µn
τn
+
ε
τn
)
− Φ
(
θ0 − µn
τn
− ε
τn
)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. Thus, equation (2) here is expressed as
PXn1 |θ0
({
Xn1 : Φ
(
θ0 − µn
τn
+
ε
τn
)
− Φ
(
θ0 − µn
τn
− ε
τn
)
≤ α
})
≥ p. (6)
Notice that the data appear in (6) only through µn, however, we cannot express µn as an
analytic function of α. If one could do so, then one could define the region of integration to
evaluate the outside probability. Hence, a similar analytic expression to equation (3) cannot be
immediately derived. Therefore, we use Monte Carlo simulation to better understand Equation
(6).
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Figure 8: Gaussian model. ε as a function of
n where α and p are fixed at 0.5 and 0.95,
respectively. The true parameter is θ0 = 1.
To make matters concrete, fix θ0 = 1, σ
2 = 1
(i.e., Xn1
iid∼ N(1, 1)), and assign a diffuse prior θ ∼
N(0, 100). Using Monte-Carlo simulation we compute
the value of ε satisfying equation (6) for a range of
α and p between 0 and 1, and for the values of n =
1, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, and 1000.
Figure 7 show a contour plot of ε as a function of
α and p for three different values of n. On each of
these panels we mark the value of ε for α = 0.5 and
p = 0.95. This value of ε has the following meaning:
with high sampling probability (p = 0.95), a large pos-
terior probability (1 − α = 0.5) is assigned to the set
Aε = [θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε]c which does not contain the true
parameter, θ0. In other words, over repeated sampling
of the data, with high probably we will put a lot of
belief on values that are at least ε away from the truth.
The contour plots in Figure 7 also show that ε
shrinks across the board as n increases. This is made
more clear in Figure 8 showing ε as a function of n for fixed α and p (0.5 and 0.95, respectively).
For these values of α and p, the largest value of ε is 0.65 (when n = 3).
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B Coefficient of variation
Here we consider the coefficient of variation model, and carry out a similar analysis as in the
above section. Let X1, . . . Xn
iid∼ N(θ, σ2) where both θ and σ2 are unknown. Let ψ := σθ be
the parameter of interest. The true parameters are taken to be (µ0, σ0) = (1, 10) so ψ0 = 10.
Figure 9 shows ε as a function of n for α and p fixed (0.5 and 0.9, respectively), and n =
5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000.
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Figure 9: Coefficient of variation. ε as a function of n where α and p are fixed (0.5 and 0.9, respectively). The
true parameter is ψ0 = 10.
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